Wallet Security Threat Model
The broad entry point for wallet risk, control ordering, and response logic.
Security Research Hub
This page is the top-level map for Cyproli research. Use it to move from broad security domains into the supporting articles that explain control logic, implementation details, and incident-response consequences.
How to use this hub
Each cluster is designed to work as a topical system. Start with the broadest page in that area, then move into the narrower supporting guides that answer implementation and incident-response questions.
Cluster 1
Threat models, signature safety, approval abuse, delegation risk, and wallet-drain response for teams shipping wallet-facing systems.
The broad entry point for wallet risk, control ordering, and response logic.
Allowance design, approval abuse, and loss-reduction controls for wallet environments.
Session control hardening for wallet-linked application flows.
What teams should do when wallet loss is already in motion.
Cluster 2
Controls for cross-chain message validation, finality handling, validator compromise, rate limits, and bridge incident response.
The control plane for whether bridge messages should be trusted at all.
How multisig, MPC, optimistic, and light-client bridges differ in trust assumptions, failure patterns, and control priorities.
How teams reduce the blast radius of compromised validation sets.
Controls for unstable settlement assumptions and reorg-sensitive execution.
Operational response logic for bridge teams under active risk.
Cluster 3
Smart-contract, governance, privilege, and upgrade controls that reduce catastrophic protocol risk.
How to contain live risk without creating uncontrolled pause authority.
Role graph drift, over-broad grants, and authorization containment.
How hidden control paths undermine governance safety.
How teams separate proposal, approval, and execution so the release lane cannot silently mutate under pressure.
Cluster 4
The infrastructure, signer, and supply-chain controls that keep production systems from failing through trusted dependencies.
Operator discipline, signing review lanes, and containment planning.
A risk-tiered approval model for reviewing simulated effects before signers authorize treasury, admin, and upgrade actions.
How to reduce the risk of trusted RPC infrastructure becoming an attack surface.
The path from source code and dependencies to user-facing wallet prompts.